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Abstract
Recent economic forecasts increase the probability that firstly, the EMU can start as planned on
January 1, 1999 and secondly, that it will start with a large group of countries. The economic
implications of the artificially unification of "hard-currency" and "soft-currency" countries are
analysed by means of macroeconomic model simulations. The results of a large "non-optimal"
EMU are as expected. On the one hand, there are positive income effects for all countries -
although unevenly distributed over the participants - on the other hand, the internal (inflation) and
external (value of the Euro vis-à-vis the Dollar) stability are at risk. The "hard-currency" group will
be the major winner (in terms of real GDP and employment), whereas the "soft-currency" group has
to carry the adjustment costs to a regime of fixed exchange rates (Euro) which results in slower
growth, decline in employment and a deterioration of their budgetary position. The necessary
convergence of prices and interest rates leads to an increase (decrease) of inflation and interest rates
in the "hard-currency" countries ("soft-currency" countries). If the EMU will start with a large
group there will be a tendency to devalue the Euro against the Dollar. As a consequence of the
uneven economic performance of a large (non-optimal) EMU I would suggest to start the EMU
with a core group of "hard-currency" countries. After this mini EMU succeeded the other Member
States could join the EMU.
Kurzfassung
Die jüngsten Wirtschaftsprognosen erhöhen die Wahrscheinlichkeit, daß die WWU erstens wie
geplant am 1. Jänner 1999 beginnen kann und zweitens, daß sie mit einer relativ großen Zahl von
Mitgliedern beginnt. Die wirtschaftlichen Folgen eines solchen künstlichen Zusammenschlusses
von "Hartwährungs-" und "Weichwährungsländern" werden mittels makroökonomischer
Simulationen analysiert. Die Ergebnisse einer solchen "nichtoptimalen" WWU sind wie erwartet.
Einerseits treten positive Wachstumseffekte ein - obwohl nicht alle Länder gleichmäßig gewinnen -
, andererseits ist sowohl die interne (Inflation) als auch die externe Stabilität (Wert des Euro) in
Gefahr. Die "Hartwährungsländer" werden die Hauptgewinner sein (sowohl hinsichtlich der
Zuwächse des realen BIP als auch der Beschäftigung). Die hohen Anpassungskosten der
"Weichwährungsländer" spiegeln sich in geringeren BIP-Gewinnen, in Beschäftigungsverlusten
und in einer Verschlechterung ihrer Budgetposition. Die notwendige Konvergenz von Preisen und
Zinsen führt dazu, daß es zu einem Anstieg (Sinken) in den "Hartwährungsländern"
("Weichwährungsländern) kommt. Wenn die WWU mit einer großen Gruppe von Ländern beginnt,
kommt es sehr wahrscheinlich zu einer Abwertung des Euro gegenüber dem Dollar. Wegen der zu
erwartenden ungleichen wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung in einer (nichtoptimalen) WWU würde ich
empfehlen, daß die WWU mit einer kleinen Kerngruppe von "Hartwährungsländern" beginnt.
Wenn sich herausstellt, daß diese Mini-WWU erfolgreich ist, wäre es ein Anreiz für die anderen
EU-Mitgliedstaaten, der WWU beizutreten.
The author
Prof. Dr. Fritz Breuss, Research Institute for European Affairs at the University of Economics and
1 of 2 26.10.97 19:18
EIoP: Text 1997-010: Abstract http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/1997-010a.htmBusiness Administration, Vienna; email: breuss@fgr.wu-wien.ac.at and senior economist at the
Austrian Institute of Economic Research (WIFO), Vienna; email: breuss@wsr.ac.at
2 of 2 26.10.97 19:18
EIoP: Text 1997-010: Abstract http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/1997-010a.htm 
The Economic Consequences of a Large EMU - Results of Macroeconomic
Model Simulations
Fritz Breuss
European Integration online Papers (EIoP) Vol. 1 (1997) N° 010;
http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/1997-010a.htm
Date of Publication in  : 20.5.1997
Abstract
Contents:
1. Introduction 
2. Political versus Economic Optimality of the EMU 
2.1 Political Considerations 
2.2 Latest Economic Forecasts Increase the Probability of a Large EMU 
2.3 What Tells Us Economic Theory about the Optimal Size of a Monetary Union?
3. Macroeconomic Effects of a Large EMU in Model Simulations 
3.1 EMU - A Macroeconomic Project 
3.2 The Model 
3.3 The Simulation Assumptions 
3.4 Simulation Results of a Large EMU
4. Conclusions 
References
1
1. Introduction
According to the latest examination of the economic situation of the European Union in the light of
the Spring 1997 economic forecasts of the Commission's services, the Member States made further
progress towards meeting the convergence criteria and there are good prospects for a majority of
countries to be ready to participate in monetary union from 1 January 1999. With the exception of
Greece and Italy all Member States would be ready to start with the EMU. This rather optimistic
prospects by the Commission contrast sharply with the doubts expressed in many Member States
about their own capability to meet the Maastricht criteria. If, however, the considerable efforts to cut
down the budget deficits and to keep public debt from increasing are successful the EMU project can
start as planned.
As the probability increases and the political will becomes firm that the EMU will start with a great
number of EU countries it is worthwile to analyse the economic consequences of a large EMU. This
examination is done by means of macroeconomic model simulations. Such experiments should also
help to answer the old question whether EU-15 is already an optimum currency area. In chapter 2 the
political considerations are confronted with the economic arguments on the optimality of a monetary
union. Chapter 3 describes the model experiments and the results. Conclusions are drawn in chapter
4.
2. Political versus Economic Optimality of the EMU
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According to the logic of European integration after World War II establishing the EMU finishes the
process of economic integration. Comparing the Single Market of the EU with those of the United
States, many economists would agree that "one market" only works properly with "one money".
Apart from the economic logic of a single currency in a single market the EMU project is a highly
political one. The creation of the EMU in 1999 can be compared in its political implications to the
creation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951. In both cases we can witness
the "Jean Monnet" effect: Pushing political integration indirectly by means of economic integration!
From a political perspective the ideal EMU should comprise all 15 Member States of the Union.
Only in this case the danger of a Europe "a deux vitesses" can be ruled out. However, a differentiated
integration is already anticipated in the Maastricht Treaty. Although in the last few years a
tremendous convergence has taken place as far as the relevant macro variables inflation, interest
rates, budget deficits and public debt are concerned. Nevertheless, even the most optimistic forecasts
for the year 1997 indicate that not all EU Member States will be able to fulfil the convergence
cirteria, in particular those concerning the fiscal criteria (budget deficit and public debt). Therefore,
the convergence criteria define the dividing line between the "pre-ins" and the "outs" when the
Council, meeting in the composition of the Heads of State or Government (Art. 109j(4) EC Treaty)
has to decide by a qualified majority in Spring 1998 which country can participate. Although this
decision is taken on the basis of the reports by the Commission and the EMI it will be a highly
political decision.
If, however, the political desire for creating an as large as possible EMU right from the beginning
jumps ahead of economic capability of the EU countries to meet the criteria of an optimum currency
area the working of the Single Market is not improved but in danger.
2
2.2 Latest Economic Forecasts Increase the Probability of a Large EMU
The latest Spring 1997 economic forecasts by the OECD and the European Commission confirm
further progress towards economic convergence in the European Union. Member States have been
taking impressive efforts to reduce excessive levels of government borrowing, in particular since
1995/96. However, the simultaneous implementation of budgetary measures to cut public deficits
have not only resulted in a decline in inflation and in long-term interest rates but have reduced real
aggregate demand considerably. According to OECD model simulations (OECD (1996, p. 18 ff.)) the
loss of aggregate demand amounts to around one percentage point of real GDP in the years 1996 and
1997. As a consequence of the reduction of domestic demand (theoretically speaking the right-ward
shift of the IS curve in the Mundell-Fleming model) one can expect, that the level of interest rates
comes down. This in turn will lead to a stimulation of investment as of beginning of 1998/99 and
hence will result in an upswing in Europe.
In Spring 1998 the Council decides about the participants in the EMU on the basis of the economic
data for the year 1997. If one takes the rather optimistic Spring 1997 forecasts by the European
Commission for the year 1997 (see Table 1) at face value two questions which occupied the
discussion recently can be answered definitely: a) the EMU will start according to the time schedule
worked out at the Council meeting in Madrid in December 1995, namely on 1 January 1999; b) with
great probability there will be a start with a large EMU.
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In a "strict" interpretation of the EC Treaty only three Member States (France, Luxembourg, Finland)
would meet all the necessary convergence criteria in 1997. However, Art. 104c(2) of the EC Treaty
allows a more "flexible" interpreation - in particular concerning the fiscal criteria. Accordingly, the
ratio government deficit to gross domestic product should not exceed the reference value (3% of
GDP), unless a) "either the ratio has declined substantially and continuously and reached a level that
comes close the the reference value; or b) the excess over the reference value is only exceptional and
temporary and the ratio remains close to the reference value". Similarly, the ratio of government debt
to gross domestic product should not exceed the reference value (60% of GDP), "unless the ratio is
sufficiently diminishing and approaching the reference value at a satisfactory pace".
Taking the Art. 104c(2) interpretation, according to the forecasts for the year 1997, the EMU could
start with 10 to 11 Member States. Greece meets none of the five convergence criteria. Denmark and
the United Kingdom may use their opting-out clause (Protocols 11 and 12 of the Treaty of European
Union - TEU). Schweden, so far, has chosen not to participate the ERM of the EMS which, however
is a precondition for taking part in the EMU. Whether Italy will be in the first round is more a
political than an economic question. If the general government deficit is the most important criteria
to look at then Italy will not yet reach the 3 per cent reference value in 1997. Then there remains a
group of 10 Member States which could start with the EMU on 1 January 1999, namely Belgium,
Germany, Spain, France, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Austria, Portugal and Finland. It should
be mentioned that the Spring 1997 forecasts by the OECD secretariat (not yet published) are much
more cautious as far as the deficit reference values are concerned. Whereas the forecast by the EU
Commission sees only Greece and Italy above the 3% reference value, the OECD forecasts that
Belgium, Germany, Greece, France, Italy, Austria and the United Kingdom will have a general
government deficit above the 3% reference value. More in line with the OECD figures than with
those of the Commission are also the deficit forecasts by the IMF in its Spring 1997 forecast (IMF
(1997).
The trial selection of EMU candidates just made on the basis of economic forecast for 1997 would
come close to the political ideal of a large EMU. However, one has to ask the question whether a
large EMU would be also optimal in economic terms. This question will be tackled firstly by refering
to theoretical arguments on the "optimum currency area" in the next chapter and finally by own
model simulations in chapter 3.
3
2.3 What Tells Us Economic Theory about the Optimal Size of a Monetary
Union?
Robert Mundell (1961) was the first who posed the question about the optimal size of a monetary
area. He founded the so-called "optimum currency area" theory (OCA theory). With flexible
exchange rates countries can compensate for external shocks. If two (ore more) countries fix their
exchange rates (or form a monetary union) one of two things are required that one can speak of an
"optimum currency area". First, member countries should be affected by economic shocks in similar
ways ("symmetric shocks"). Or second, there must be an adjustment mechanism in order to
compensate for "asymmetric shocks" (which affect different countries in different ways; e.g. like a
rise in oil prices or the implications of German unification, etc.): flexible wages, highly mobile
labour so that workers move from declining areas to expanding ones, or a more flexible fiscal policy.
Although other authors stressed additional important factors - like the degree of openess (McKinnon
(1963) or product diversification (Kenen (1969, 1995)) - labour market flexibility is still one of the
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Graph 1
The trade-off between economic convergence and labour mobility can be illustrated in Graph 1
(adapted from DeGrauwe (1996a) and The Economist, November 9, 1996, p. 110). The bigger the
differences between member countries (e.g., the economic divergence in terms of economic growth
of real GDP), the more mobile labour must be if monetary union is to work. Below the AA line
countries could form a monetary union without excessive adjustment costs, because labour flexibility
is high. They would belong to an "optimum currency area". Countries above the AA line are
confronted with high adjustment costs when forming a monetary union. These countries are
charaterized by low labour market flexibility (low wage flexibility, low labour mobility). This
situation typically describes the economic situation of the labour market in Europe. The economy of
the United States is not much more homogeneous than Europe's; but because labour is highly mobile
there, its monetary union works. If there are "asymmetric shocks" a large or maxi EMU will work
with less probability than a core EMU.
Numerous empirical studies (most of which are time series analyses of demand and supply shocks
like the prototype study of Bayoumi-Eichengreen (1994); for an overview of empirical OCA studies,
see Breuss (1997, chapter 7); see also Tichy (1996)) indicate that a large EMU comprising all 15
Member States of the EU are certainly not an "optimum currency area". The majority of these studies
identify a core EMU as an "optimum currency area", mostly countries belonging to the DM block.
Although the OCA theory has some appeal, it also has many drawbacks: a) The OCA theory does not
supply a good theoretical foundation for the convergence criteria as formulated in the Maastricht
Treaty (DeGrauwe (1996a)). b) The OCA theory mainly looks at the (adjustment) cost side of a
monetary union and, hence, is a bad guide for choosing the potential participants in the EMU
(DeGrauwe (1996b)). c) The OCA theory and its empirical tests are only concentrated on the past
development. It says not very much about possible learning processes in the future (e.g. the
adjustment in the wage policy when becoming a member of EMU; more wage flexibility etc.). As a
positive example of such learning processes one could mention those countries which linked their
exchange rates to the DM (like the Netherlands and Austria since 1981; for the Austrian experience,
see Breuss (1992, 1996)).
3. Macroeconomic Effects of a Large EMU in Model Simulations
3.1 EMU - A Macroeconomic Project
In the following simulation experiment I will take into account the pros and cons of forming the
EMU as postulated by many authors in the literature. One of the most prominent examples of such
studies is that by the European Commission, titled "One market - one money" (EC, 1990).
The establishment of the EMU is primarily a macroeconomic project and implies two things:
1. "The adoption of the conversion rates at which the currencies of the Member States shall be
irrevocably fixed and at which irrevocably fixed rate the ECU shall be substituted for these
currencies, and the ECU (now - Euro, on 1 January 1999) will become a currency in its own
right" (Art. 109l(4) EC Treaty). Which method will be used to define the conversion rates is
still an open question. Three alternative procedures are possible: either the EMS central rates
or the actual exchange rates at the end of 1998 or an average of some period before (the
Lamfalussy formula). In the model simulations the EMU is portrayed by system of fixed
exchange rates within the EU. The bilateral exchange rates of the Member States are fixed
vis-à-vis the DM. Technically speaking, this implies that the DM is becoming the future Euro
in the model context. 
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the European Central Bank (ECB). That means, starting on 1 January 1999 the monetary policy
for the Euro is centralized for all Member States participating in the EMU.
4
3.2 The Model
For the model simulations, the Oxford Economic Forecasting - OEF model (OEF, 1996) is used. It
was already used in a recent study to evaluate the impact of the EMU primarily on the Austrian
economy (see Breuss (1997, chapter 3). It was also used to analyse the impact of the EMU on
external trade relations with the Central an Eastern European countries (CEECs; see Breuss (1996b)).
The OEF model is a multi-country model which comprises the major OECD countries plus China,
the Eastern European countries and the developing countries as country blocks. The EU is
represented by 9 Member States (the latest version - which I did not use in my simulation excercises -
also includes the EU countries Denmark and Finland). Theoretically speaking it is a
Mundell-Fleming type model with flexible exchange rates. It does not only model the usual demand
components (consumption, investment, exports and imports) but also the supply side (production
function, NAIRU, factor supply, productivity etc.). The exchange rates follow the portfolio approach.
The bilateral exchange rates of the EU countries vis-à-vis the DM are explained by interest rate
differentials and expectations about exchange rate changes. The exchange rate vis-à-vis the
US-Dollar its linked to the determination of the bilateral exchange rates against the DM.
3.3 The Simulation Assumptions
In the following exercise I assume that the EMU will start with a "large" group of countries.
Politically speaking this would mean around 10 to 11 EU Member States (see the trial decision in the
previous chapter). Due to the technical constraint of the OEF model a "large" EMU means in the
following all 9 EU countries for which explicit country models are available. In addition I will divide
these countries in two groups according to their exchange rate behaviour vis-à-vis the DM in the
recent past. Those countries which have experienced a rather stable link of their bilateral exchange
rates vis-à-vis the DM in recent years (even during the crises of the EMS in September 1992 and in
August 1993) are labeled "hard-currency group" (Belgium, Germany, France, Netherlands, Austria).
Those countries which have exhibited strong fluctuations around the DM in the past (in particular
because of a sharp devaluation during the EMS crises) are called "soft-currency countries" (Spain,
Italy, Sweden, United Kingdom).
The EMU in general and the Euro in particular are assumed to have four economic implications. The
respective model inputs and their positive and negative economic impacts are explained in detail in
Table 2
1. A reduction of transaction costs 
2. More competition in the financial sector 
3. Exchange rate stability 
4. Dynamic or growth effects
Table 2
In the following simulations these effects are implemented as model inputs. No special assumption is
made concerning the future monetary policy of the European Central Bank (ECB), neither that it will
be restrictive at the beginning in order to gain credibility (which would imply an increase in the level
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against the US-Dollar. Similarly, no change in the behaviour of other agents (e.g., in the wage
bargaining process) in the economy is assumed. Such assumptions and the use of an econometric
model with estimated coefficients of past behaviour may provoke the famous Lucas critique.
Admittedly, the EMU is a centenary project unique in economic history. Therefore, any past
experience is of little help in analysing the possible outcome of this historical experiment.
Nevertheless, it seems better to use a multi-country model framework to analyse consitently the
implications of the EMU than just to work with thumb rules.
One has to take into consideration that a) the simulation results depend crucially on the assumptions
(in particular concerning the exchange rate stability) and that b) the size of the quantified effects
depends on the "critical mass" of countries participating in the EMU starting on 1 January 1999.
5
3.4 Simulation Results of a Large EMU
Graph 2a, Graph 2b, Graph 2c, Graph 2d, Graph 2e
Table 3
1. Given the assumptions made in the previous section the simulation experiments imply a basic
trade-off when the EMU starts with a "large" group of countries. It is obvious that a large EMU
will result in overall positive GDP effects but at the same time the internal and external
stability of the EU is at risk. The reason is that a large EMU would be an artificial union of
"hard-currency countries" (which already had enough practice with fixed exchange rates
(vis-à-vis the DM)) and of "soft-currency countries" which have no experience with fixed
exchange rates. In any case, the winners - measured by the increase in real GDP are the
countries which belong to the "hard-currency group". The Graph 2a to 2e show the time profile
for the major macro variables for all countries separately. Table 3 presents the simulation
results for the first and the fifth year for the countries grouped into "hard-currency" and
"soft-currency" countries als well as for the EU average and for Austria. 
2. The winners and losers are not evenly distributed in the EMU. In a large EMU the gains of the
"hard-currency group" would amount to 1.9% of real GDP after five years (cumulative from
1999 to 2003), whereas those of the "soft-currency group" would only be 1.4%. As a result on
EU average real GDP could increase by 1.7% in the medium run (see Graph 2a, Table 3). 
3. The employment effects are consitent with the real income effects. However, as many experts
foresee the EMU as such is not able to solve the huge structural unemployment problems
presently dominating in Europe. Again, the "hard-currency group" would slightly gain (+0.8%
more independent employment after five years), whereas the "soft-currency group" would lose
(-0.9%). On EU average the employment impulse of the EMU would be very moderate (not
more than 0.1 percentage points in the medium run; see Graph 2b, Table 3). 
4. As mentioned earlier it is assumed that there is no change in the wage (bargaining) policy
when entering the EMU. However, one of the paramount implications of the EMU is the
limitation of the national sovereignty in many macro policy areas. Monetary policy is
centralized in the EU via the ECB; the exchange rates are fixed (introduction of the Euro); the
fiscal policy has to be in line with the rule of the "stability and growth pact" for Stage III of the
EMU (i.e., the public deficit should normally not surpass the reference value of 3% of GDP).
After having lost the room for manoeuvre in nearly all areas of national macro policy, the only
major policy instrument that remains in national hands is the incomes and wage policy (Breuss
(1994)). Again, in this area the learning costs are probably higher in the "soft-currency
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change in the wage policy - the transition from a "small" (only the "hard-currency group") to a
"large" EMU will lead to an effective real depreciation in the "hard-currency countries" and an
effective real appreciation in the "soft-currency countries" (measured by relative unit labour
costs in common currencies; see Breuss (1997, chapter 3)). The resulting disadvantages in
competitiveness can only be eliminated if the "soft-currency countries" will succeed in
reorienting their wage policy towards a more productivity oriented policy. The Austrian
example of its "hard-currency" policy stance since 1981 can serve as a good example (see
Breuss (1992)). After linking the Schilling to the DM Austria had to adjust not only the
nominal variables (interest rates, inflation, wages) but also its labour productivity to German
standards in order to remain competitive in international markets. 
5. In addition to the possible income effects which occur in all countries participating in the EMU
due to the "reduction the transactions costs", the investment-stimulating effect of "more
competition in the financial sector" and the so-called "dynamic effects" only the "hard-currency
countries" profit from the "exchange rate stability" implied by establishing the EMU. The
reason is that the countries of the "soft-currency group" competing on the Single Market no
longer could take advantages of competitive devaluation. According to model simulations
carried out by the EU Commission (EC (1995; 1996, p. 17)) the exchange rate turbulences
from December 1994 to April 1995 disturbed intra-EU trade considerably. Accordingly, real
GDP of the EU has been reduced by 1/2% (in Germany and Austria, respectively, real GDP
declined by -1 1/2% over two years - 1995/96; Italy gained by 2/3% in the same period). The
total results of the large EMU (see Table 3) depend crucially on the assumptions concerning
the exchange rate stability. If one would assume that exchange rate turbulences comparable to
the period 1992 to 1996 will not happen in the future (either because the exchange rates of all
EU countries are already in line with the fundamentals or because the progress in convergence
also implies a convergence in the exchange rate development in the future) then the income
effects would be more positive for the "soft-currency group" than for the "hard-currency
group". This extreme case can be verified by subtracting the column 3 in Table 3 from the total
results in column 5. 
6. On the Council meeting in Dublin in December 1996 a regulation was proposed concerning the
relationship between the "ins" and the "pre-ins". In a newly defined exchange rate mechanism
(ERM II) those countries which do not participate in the EMU from the beginning should
manage to hold their exchange rates vis-à-vis the Euro in close margins. If the EU succeeds
with this procedure, the economic effects from the "exchange rate stability" should be of the
same amount, whether the EMU is large or small at the beginning. All other positive growth
and employment effects depend of course on the size of the EMU. A critical mass is necessary
in order to get measurable positive effects from the "reduction of transactions costs", the
"competition effects in the financial sector" and in particular from the "dynamic effects" which
depend on the utilization of economies of scale. 
7. The internal stability is in danger if all EU countries or at least a large number of countries
would start with the EMU. In particular assembling "hard-currency" and "soft-currency"
countries lead to a currency area which is not optimal. Fixing the exchange rates (introduction
of the Euro) induces strong pressure towards convergence of the price levels. As a consequence
the price levels increase in the "hard-currency countries" (higher inflation by 6.8% after five
years) and decrease in the "soft-currency countries" (lower inflation by -11.8%). On EU
average this process would lead to a reduction in the price level (CPI) by 0.7% in the medium
run (see Graph 2cc, Table 3). 
8. As the introduction of the Euro enhanced with a centralized monetary policy creates an
integrated financial market one can expect a further convergence in the levels of interest rates.
Although a considerable convergence took already place since 1996, there is still an interest
rate gap between the "hard-currency" and the "soft-currency" countries. The model simulations
show that after establishing the EMU this process of convergence continues, implying an
increase of the long-term interest rates in the "hard-currency group" by 0.3% after five years
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would decline by one percentage point in the medium run (see Graph 2d, Table 3). 
9. The uneven real performance of a large EMU implies also the danger of a divergence of both
country groups concerning their fiscal criteria. Taking into consideration the "stability and
growth pact" for Stage III this would imply a further entry barrier for the "pre-ins". Because
these countries would not be able to meet the reference value of the public deficit (3% of GDP)
by their own. This would imply either that they would permanently be penalized which would
even more deteriorate their fiscal performance or secondly, the other EMU countries would
have to "bail out" via fiscal transfers in order to stabilize the EMU (see also Siebert (1996),
Scharmer (1997)). Although the EC Treaty in Art. 104b explicitly excludes the possibility of a
bail-out ("no bail-out rule") it would become a major topic of solidarity (Art. A of TEU and
Art. 2 of EC Treaty) as well as of a question of financial solidarity (Art. 103a EC Treaty; see
Heinemann (1995)). 
10. The external stability of the Euro is in danger the more of those countries take part in the EMU
which were responsible for the exchange rate turbulences in the recent past. The model
simulations reflect these suggestions by a depreciation of the Euro against the US-Dollar by
6.8% after five years. If, however, in order to gain credibility for the Euro in a large EMU (i.e.,
in order to avoid a devaluation of the Euro) the ECB would switch to a very restrictive
monetary policy stance right at the beginning of the EMU in 1999 interest rates would increase
and hence, many of the simulated positive income effects would not materialize (see Table 3).
6
4. Conclusions
The EMU is the final goal of European economic integration. For political reasons the larger the
EMU the less is the danger of a Europe "à deux vitesses". However, from an economic viewpoint the
EU-15 can hardly be claimed to be an "optimum currency area". Compared to the United States
labour mobility and flexibility are low in Europe. This however, is one of the most important
ingredients for the working of a monetary union. Either it consists of a homogenous group of
countries or the non-homogeneity is compensated by labour mobility between the Member States.
These theoretical arguments are underlined by the macroeconomic model simulations of a large
EMU carried out in this paper.
Recent economic forecasts increase the probability that firstly, the EMU can start as planned on
January 1, 1999 and secondly, that it will start with a large group of countries. This means that
"hard-currency" and "soft-currency" countries will be linked artificially. What then are the
consequences of a large EMU right from the beginning? This is analysed in this paper by means of
macroeconomic model simulations. The implications of a large "non-optimal" EMU are as expected.
On the one hand, there are positive income effects for all countries - although unevenly distributed
over the participants - on the orther hand, the internal (inflation) and external (value of the Euro
vis-à-vis the Dollar) stability are at risk.
As a conclusion of the unequal economic performance in a large EMU I would suggest that the EMU
should start with a core EMU consisting just of those countries which proved to be shock-resistent in
their exchange-rate behaviour in the last few years, in particular during the EMS crises in 1992 and
1993. The core consists of countries which did keep their currencies relatively fix vis-à-vis the DM.
In this "hard-curreny" group the financial convergence has already occured (similar levels of interest
rates and inflation). To the core EMU would belong Belgium, (Denmark, if it did not take advantage
of its "opting-out" rule), Germany, France, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Austria. There would be no
danger of internal and external stability. The Euro would start as a credible international currency.
8 of 10 26.10.97 19:19
EIoP: Text 1997-010: Full text http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/1997-010.htmAfter some years of positive performance of this core EMU the other EU Member States could join if
they are ready concerning the convergence criteria and if they were able to link their currency in a
narrow margin to the Euro. As early as the year 2002, when the Euro is becoming the legal tender the
second group should join the core EMU group.
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Convergence Criteria for 1997
Consumer
Price
Inflation
(1)
General
Government
Surplus (+)
or Deficit (-)
General
Government
Gross Debt
Long-Term
Interest
Rate
Exchange Rates Within
the EMS All Criteria Fulfilled
Normal
Fluctuation
Margins
ERM
Participation „Strict"
Interpretation
(2)
Art. 104c(2)
Interpretation
(2) %
change % of GDP % of GDP % 1995/96 1996
Belgium 1.9 -2.7 126.7 5.8 yes yes no yes
Denmark 2.4 +0.3 67.2 6.2 yes yes no (4) yes (5)
Germany 1.8 -3.0 61.8 5.6 yes yes no yes
Greece 6.0 -4.9 108.3 10.8 no no no no
Spain 2.3 -3.0 68.1 6.6 yes yes no yes
France 1.6 -3.0 57.9 5.8 yes yes yes yes
Ireland 2.0 -1.0 68.3 6.4 yes yes no (4) yes
Italy 2.3 -3.2 122.4 7.0 no yes (3) no no/yes ?
Luxem-
bourg
1.7 +1.1 6.5 6.0 yes yes yes yes
Nether-
lands
2.4 -2.3 76.2 5.6 yes yes no(4) yes
Austria 2.0 -3.0 68.8 5.6 yes yes no yes
Portugal 2.5 -3.0 64.1 6.5 yes yes no yes
Finland 0.9 -1.9 59.2 5.9 no yes (3) yes (4) yes
Sweden 0.7 -2.6 76.5 6.7 no no no no
United
Kindom
2.2 -2.9 54.7 7.5 no no no no (5)
EU-15
average
2.1 -2.9 72.9 6.2 countries countries
Reference
value
2.6 (*) -3.0 60.0 8.2 (+) 3 10-11 (12)
(1) Price inflation is evaluated according to the „harmonized" conumer price indices (CPI).
(2) Refers to the fiscal criteria (general government balance and general government gross debt)
according to the EC Treaty, Art. 104c(2).
(3) Since October 12, 1996 Finland takes part in the exchange-rate mechanism of the EMS; Italy
joined again on November 2, 1996.
(4) The Council (ECOFIN) decided on July 1996 that Denmark and Ireland met the fiscal criteria
based on data of 1995 (no excessive deficit); Luxembourg always complied with this condition; on
May 12, 1997 the Council decided that also the Netherlands and Finland (based on data of 1996)
have no longer an excessive deficit.
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Treaty).
(*) Defined as the average inflation rate of those three countries with the lowest inflation rates plus
1.5%.
(+) Defined as the average nominal long-term interest rate of those three countries with the lowest
inflation rates plus 2 percentage points.
Convergence criteria according to the EC Treaty, Art. 109j and the Protocols 5 and 6.
EMS = European Monetary System; ERM = Exchange-rate mechanism of the EMS.
Source: European Commission, Spring 1997 forecasts.
Table II
Model Inputs and Economic Impact of a Large EMU
Economic Effects
(model inputs)
Positive Impact Negative Impact
Reduction of
transaction costs
(0.2% to 0.9% of GDP;
adjustment of disposable
income - 
less in hard-currency
countries, more in
soft-currency countries)
Abolition of costs of
foreign currency exchange
(positive for tourists,
export and import agents)
Banks lose part of their
currency exchange business
(possibly a reduction in
employment in this sector)
More competition in
the financial sector
(-1% short-term interest
rates;
evenly imputed for all
countries)
Stimulating cross-border
competition in the
financial sector (banks and
insurances) improves the
conditions for financing
business investment
Profit sqeeze in the banking
sector (possibly a reduction
in employment in this sector)
Exchange rate
stability
(imposition of the
exchange-rate fluctuations
of the period 1992-96 to the
period 1999-2003)
Hard-currency countries
gain because these
countries are no longer
confronted with the
devaluation threat of the
soft-currency countries 
Interest rates and the price
level will converge (i.e., an
increase in the
hard-currency countries) 
Soft-currency countries will
lose because these countries
can no longer use
devaluations in order to
improve their
competitiveness 
Interest rates and the price
level will converge (i.e., a
decrease in the soft-currency
countries). 
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The internal (inflation) and
the external stability (the
external value of the Euro)
are at risk in a large EMU 
Dynamic or growth
effects
(increase of total factor
productivity - TFP - by
0.3% to 0.7% according to
the Baldwin multiplier)
A stronger TFP increase
and therefore larger growth
effects may be expected in
the hitherto less efficient
soft-currency countries.
Less additional TFP increases
and therefore weaker growth
effects can be expected in the
already highly efficient
hard-currency countries. 
The increase of TFP leads
partly also to job losses. 
Table III
Macroeconomic Effects of a Large EMU
Partial effects of EMU Total Effects of
EMU
(5)=(1+2+3+4+5)
Reduction of
Transaction
Costs
(1)
More
Competition in
the Fincancial
Sector
(2)
Exchange-rate
Stability
(3)
Dynamic or
Growth
Effects
(4)
1st
year
5th
year
1st
year
5th
year
1st
year
5th year 1st
year
5th
year
1st year 5th year
(Deviations from base line solution(1) in %)
GDP effects:
HC 0.25 0.12 0.31 0.18 0.28 0.16 0.13 1.46 0.97 1.92
AT 0.45 0.00 0.36 0.25 0.06 0.30 0.21 1.64 1.08 2.19
SC 0.72 0.24 0.38 0.60 -0.51 -1.97 0.18 2.54 0.77 1.41
EU 0.44 0.17 0.34 0.35 -0.04 -0.70 0.15 1.89 0.89 1.71
Employment
effects:
HC 0.09 0.11 0.12 0.17 0.08 0.21 0.04 0.34 0.33 0.83
AT 0.13 0.09 0.10 0.21 0.02 0.22 0.04 0.11 0.29 0.63
SC 0.23 0.44 0.11 0.57 -0.13 -2.15 0.03 0.24 0.24 -0.90
EU 0.15 0.24 0.12 0.33 0.00 -0.74 0.03 0.30 0.30 0.13
Price effects:
HC 0.08 1.85 0.13 2.44 0.05 5.0 -0.13 -2.46 0.13 6.83
AT 0.19 1.90 0.14 2.80 0.00 3.10 -0.07 -1.35 0.26 6.45
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EU 0.13 2.35 0.02 2.60 -0.06 -3.12 -0.16 -2.50 -0.07 -0.67
Interest rate
effects:
HC 0.20 0.78 -0.84 -0.36 0.11 2.19 -0.33 -2.27 -0.86 0.34
AT 0.23 0.66 -0.93 -0.45 0.08 2.25 -0.38 -2.55 -1.00 -0.09
SC 0.22 0.65 -0.89 -0.39 -0.02 -0.51 -0.41 -2.50 -1.10 -2.75
EU 0.21 0.72 -0.86 -0.37 0.05 0.99 -0.36 -2.37 -0.96 -1.03
Budgetary
effects:
HC 0.32 0.34 0.26 0.46 0.07 0.29 0.11 0.73 0.76 1.82
AT 0.55 0.23 0.43 0.81 0.02 -0.01 0.18 1.18 1.18 2.21
SC 0.26 0.36 0.22 0.63 -0.14 -1.81 0.10 0.92 0.44 0.10
EU 0.29 0.35 0.24 0.54 -0.02 -0.64 0.10 0.82 0.61 1.07
Exchange rate
(Euro/US-$)(2) 0.01 1.83 0.27 2.61 -0.01 4.86 -0.01 -2.52 0.26 6.78
(1) Base line solution is the EMU scenario with fixed exchange rates vis-à-vis the DM, starting in
January 1999. The scenario "Exchange-rate stability" compares the EMU scenario with a situation of
exchange-rate fluctuations during the period 1992 to 1996. "Large EMU" means in the model, that 9
EU Member States participate in the EMU. 
(2) An increase (decrease) means devalutaion (revaluation) of the Euro against the US-Dollar.
HC = Hard-currency group (Belgium, Germany, France, Netherlands, Austria).
SC = Soft-currency group (Spain, Italy, Sweden, United Kingdom).
AT = Austria; EU = HC + SC.
Source: Own calculations with the OEF World model. 
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